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Google v. Spain:  
A Right To Be Forgotten? 
Ignacio Cofone* 
Abstract 
The comment shows that the recent decision in Google v. Spain does not 
rule on the right to be forgotten, but rather on the liability of search 
engines under the rights and obligations established in the Data 
Protection Directive. It then makes a brief evaluation on the case arguing 
that the decision fails to offer a consistent balance between the right to 
privacy and the freedom of expression. 
 
Introduction 
The right to be forgotten was popularized in the public debate by 
Mayer-Schönberger’s book Delete.1 The book argued that one of the main 
problems with data storage is that it lacks the human characteristic of 
forgetting.2 The book also introduced “the right to forget”, proposing that 
all information should have an expiration date.3 Policymakers, especially 
in the European Union (EU), were sympathetic to the concept.4 
The right to be forgotten extends to the internet the old French 
droit à l’oubli and the Italian diritto al' oblio regarding criminal records—
sometimes called right to oblivion, and literally translatable as right to 
forget. Both rights were affirmed by courts based on the constitutional 
dispositions stating that prison has the aim of social reinsertion, and it is in 
the interest of both social reinsertion and the privacy of people who were 
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1 Some precedents can be seen before that in reviews of European legal thought regarding 
privacy. See e.g. David H. Flaherty, Controlling Surveillance: Can Privacy Protection be 
Made Effective?, in TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 167, 172 (Philip E. 
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AGE 92-127 (2009). 
3 See id. at 169-195.  
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convicted for the records to be erased after some time. For data protection, 
European policymakers decided to take the matter one step further.5 
In the next section, the right to be forgotten is briefly explained. 
Section three summarizes the case of Google v. Spain, and section four 
evaluates the rights provided by the Data Protection Directive invoked in 
that case. Section five explains the difference between the right to be 
forgotten and the rights provided under the Data Protection Directive, and 
section six offers a criticism of the ruling. Finally, section seven 
concludes.  
  
I. The Right to be Forgotten 
 
The right to be forgotten has been a concrete topic of debate in EU 
policy, its importance increasing since Commissioner Reding presented 
the General Data Protection Regulation proposal in 2012. 6  The 
regulation—proposed to be operative in the EU in 2015—follows the 
general principles of the Data Protection Directive 7  while also 
incorporating additional elements including the right to be forgotten.  
In an illustrative classification, Fleisher offers three interpretations 
of the right to be forgotten.8 First, and least controversially, the right to be 
forgotten can mean that one has the right to delete the information one 
posts online. Many—although not all—social network sites already allow 
for this. Secondly, it can mean that one has the right to delete any 
information about oneself that one posts online, including information that 
others have re-posted. Third, it can mean that one has the right to 
eliminate any information that is available online about oneself, regardless 
of origin.  
As the General Data Protection Regulation proposal stipulates, the 
right to be forgotten allows data subjects to request a data controller, at 
any time, to remove from their database any piece of information 
regarding that data subject, regardless of the source of the information.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 While the right to forget focuses on the expiration of information after some time, the 
right to be forgotten focuses on the control over one’s personal information. See Rolf H. 
Weber, The Right to Be Forgotten More Than a Pandora’s Box?, 2 JIPITEC 120 (2011).  
6 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free movement of Such Data (Jan. 25, 2012),   
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf 
[hereinafter, Regulation Proposal]. 
7 Directive 1995/46/EC. 
8 See Peter Fleischer:Privacy…?, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion, (Mar. 9, 
2011), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-thinking-about-right-to-
oblivion.html. 
9 See Vivianne Reding, The Upcoming Data Protection Reform for the European Union, 
1 INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 3 (2011). 
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Article 17(1)10 outlines four possible conditions  for this right to be 
claimable. 
The first condition requires that the data is no longer necessary for 
the purpose for which it was collected (purpose limitation principle).11 The 
second condition occurs when the data subject revokes consent when such 
consent was required for the collection of the data.12 The third condition 
requires that the data subject exercise the right to object.13 The fourth 
condition occurs when the collection or processing of the data violates any 
provision of the regulation.14  
The second condition incorporates a new element of the right to be 
forgotten in the European data protection system: revocation of consent of 
the data subject without the need to prove harm. The other three are 
already present, albeit less systematically so, in the Data Protection 
Directive.15 
This second condition refers to Article 6(1), which defines the 
legitimate collection and processing of personal data, particularly as it 
pertains to consent. This proposal means that data subjects can request the 
elimination of their personal data from a database in situations where the 
subject’s consent was originally the basis for acquiring or otherwise 
processing the data, based solely on a change of mind without needing to 
prove to a court that the subject suffered actual harm.16  
 
II. Google v. Spain 
 
 Shortly after the second anniversary of the regulation proposal, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled on Google v. Spain. In 2010, Mario 
Costeja requested that Google and the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia 
remove two articles published January 19, 1998 and March 9, 1998 (along 
with the corresponding links in the search engine),  which reported details 
of a government auction on his house due to his failure to pay social 
security debts.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See also Regulation Proposal, supra note 6, Recitals 53 - 54. 
11 See id. at art. 17(1)(a); see generally infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
12 See id. at art. 17(1)(b). 
13 See id. at art. 17(1)(c). 
14 See id. at art. 17(1)(d). 
15 See Meg Leta Ambrose & Jef Ausloos, The Right to be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY 1, 12 (2013). 
16 If the data was acquired based on legitimizing reasons other than consent then Article 
17(1)(b) is not applicable. This limitation is relevant since parts (b) to (f) of Article 6(1) 
contain legitimating purposes that could be applicable; concretely, the existence of a 
contract (Article 6(1)(b)), of a legal obligation (Article 6(1)(c)), vital interest of the data 
subject (Article 6(1)(d)), public interest (Article 6(1)(e)), and legitimate interests of the 
data controller (Article 6(1)(f)). Directive 1995/46/EC. 
17 See Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
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The Spanish Data Protection Authority did not back the claim 
against the newspaper due to the fact that the information was published 
lawfully. However, it did order Google Spain SL and Google Inc. to “take 
steps to remove its index data and preclude future access to the same”. 
Both Google Spain SL and Google Inc. appealed the resolution, and the 
case arrived to the court Audiencia Nacional.18 
Audiencia Nacional requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.19 
In the request, the court was asked three questions: (i) if the European data 
protection framework established in the Data Protection Directive is 
applicable to Google, (ii) if search engines are considered data controllers 
under the Directive, and (iii) if a data subject can demand a search engine 
to remove the indexation of a certain piece of information.20 
Regarding the first question, the advocate general and the court 
agree that the European framework does apply to Google, not because it is 
dealing with EU citizens, but because Google Spain is a subsidiary of 
Google Inc. situated in Spanish territory which sells advertisement spots in 
Spain that, in turn, finance the search engine. Therefore, even if data is not 
processed in Spain, the processing is done within the context of the 
activities of an establishment in a member state of the EU.21 This part of 
the ruling confirms a previously issued opinion by Article 29 Working 
Party, which has expressed an equivalent position for the applicable law of 
the directive.22 
Regarding the second question, both the advocate general and the 
court noted that Google is dealing with personal information. The court 
further affirmed that by indexing data, Google retrieves, records and 
organizes data, even if Google’s indexing is done automatically without 
distinguishing content and when this data was previously published 
elsewhere. Accordingly, the Court treats Google (and other search engines) 
as a controller, with the duties that such classification implies under the 
Directive.23  
The third question is the most relevant for the purposes of this 
comment. The question reads: 
 
“Must it be considered that the rights to erasure and 
blocking of data, provided for in Article 12(b), and the 
right to object, provided for by [subparagraph (a) of the 
first paragraph of Article 14] of Directive 95/46, extend 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See id. at ¶¶ 15-18. 
19 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 267, 2008 O.J.  C 115/47  [hereinafter TFEU]. 
20 See Google, 2014 E.C.R. C-131/12 at ¶¶ 19-20. 
21 See id. 
22 See Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regards to the Processing of 
Personal Data, “Opinion 8/2010 on Applicable Law,” Dec. 16, 2010. 
23 See Google, 2014 E.C.R. C-131/12 at ¶¶ 66-88. 
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to enabling the data subject to address himself to search 
engines in order to prevent indexing of the information 
relating to him personally, published on third parties’ 
web pages, invoking his wish that such information 
should not be known to internet users when he considers 
that it might be prejudicial to him or he wishes it to be 
consigned to oblivion, even though the information in 
question has been lawfully published by third parties?’” 
24 
 
Regarding this question, the court considered that, if the inclusion 
of certain links in the search results is at some point in time incompatible 
with the provisions of the Directive, and the data subject requests so, such 
links must be erased. The Court emphasized that, due to Article 7 of the 
Directive, data processing must be lawful at all times in order to be 
allowed to be continued.25 In addition, even information initially collected 
in a lawful way can - with the passing of time - become unlawful to 
maintain when the data becomes inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive for 
the purposes of the processing.26  
For data processing to be incompatible with the Directive,  the data 
does not necessarily have to be incorrect. It is sufficient that the data is 
inadequate or excessive for the purpose of the data processing, that it is 
outdated or that it is kept for a time longer than necessary for such 
purpose.27 The court noted that sensitive information contained in sixteen 
year old search links, can fall under the aforementioned categories.28  
As a response to the ruling, Google established a governance 
mechanism on May 30th through which European data subjects can now 
fill an online form to request that obsolete data about them be deleted from 
the lists of results.29 The search engine has already received more than 
70,000 requests.30 
 
III. Applicable Norms 
 
The court explains that the preliminary ruling is centrally 
concerned with Articles 2(b), 2(d), 4(1)(a), 4(1)(c), 12(b) and 14(1)(a) of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Id. 
25 See id. at ¶ 95. 
26 See id.  
27 See Google,  2014 E.C.R. C-131/12 at ¶¶ 72, 92-9; Directive 1995/46/EC at art. 6(c)-
6(e). 
28 See id at ¶¶ 94-98. 
29 Online form at https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch 
30 See Rosa Jimenez Cano, Google comienza a aplicar el ‘derecho al olvido’, EL PAIS, 
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Directive 95/64/EC.31 While Article 2 concerns definitions and Article 4 
concerns applicable national law, Article 12 refers to the right to erasure 
and Article 14 to the right to object.32 The latter two articles are relevant 
for the third question posed.33 
The directive contains a similar right to the one proposed in Article 
17 of the regulation proposal in Article 12(b) and Article 6(1)(e).  
However, only the second condition of that article is new.34 Article 12(b) 
of the directive establishes the right to erasure, which allows data subjects 
to request the elimination of their personal data when its retention or 
processing violates the terms of the directive, in particular (but not 
exclusively) because of being incomplete or inaccurate. 
While a narrow reading of the article will interpret “in particular” 
as “exclusively” and will only allow the deletion of the data when such 
data is incomplete or inaccurate, a broad reading will allow for such 
deletion whenever the data processing is in violation of any term of the 
directive.35 
In turn, the directive establishes the purpose-limitation principle in 
Article 6(1)(e);36 accordingly any collection, processing or storing of 
personal data must be done based on a specific, explicit and legitimate 
purpose.37 The last of the three requirements indicates that companies 
need a legitimizing basis to collect personal data, of which the most 
common is consent.38  
Data cannot be kept for longer than is necessary for the purposes 
for which it is collected or processed—a purpose that is defined, however, 
by the data controller. This rule is extended to secondary use, according to 
which the data is retained for a legitimate purpose that is different than its 
original purpose.39 This obligation for data controllers and data processers 
can be invoked, if original purpose terms are violated, by data subjects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Google, 2014 E.C.R. C-131/12 at ¶ 1. 
32 The court also mentions later on Articles 6, 7, 9 and 28. See id. at ¶ 1. 
33 See id. at ¶ 89. 
34 See Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of 
“The Right to be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, 8(3) SCRIPTED, 230, 232-233 & 240-
245 (2011). 
35 This, as it was seen, is similar to the fourth element of Article 17 of the regulation 
proposal. See Regulation Proposal, supra note 6. 
36 See generally Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regards to the 
Processing of Personal Data, 2013 O.J. 03/2013.  
37 The Directive is applicable, according to its Article 2(a), whenever there is collection, 
processing or storing of personal information, where personal information is defined as 
any information that can be traced back to a data subject. Directive 1995/46/EC. 
38 Consent is defined in Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive as “any freely given 
specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his 
agreement”. Directive 1995/46/EC.  
39 See Bert-Jaap Koops, The Inflexibility of Techno-regulation and the Case of Purpose-
binding, 5 LEGISPRUDENCE 171 (2011). 
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claiming the right to erasure contained in Article 12(b) when interpreted 
broadly,40 as Costeja seems to have done.  
The right to object is recognized in Article 14 of the Directive. It 
establishes that a data subject, proving compelling legitimate grounds 
relating to a particular situation, can object to the continued processing of 
his personal data. If a data subject does object, and he can successfully 
prove compelling legitimate grounds, then the controller must stop 
processing the data subject’s personal data, although is the controller has 
no duty to eliminate data already processed.41 
 
IV. Different Rights 
 
Under the classification made above on the possible interpretations 
of the right to be forgotten, the regulation proposal would establish the 
third, most expansive category of the right, while the data protection 
directive does not establish any of the three classifications. Under the third 
category, the right to be forgotten would likely involve not only the 
publisher of the content but also search engines that link to that content.42 
This, however, does not mean that any involvement of search engines in 
terms of liability for published content pertains the right to be forgotten.  
As can be seen in the previous sections, none of the three questions 
presented to the court are, strictly speaking, about the right to be forgotten. 
Even though the third question is related to it, and although Audiencia 
Nacional asked it mentioning the right to be forgotten, 43  the actual 
question refers in its formulation only to the rights of erasure and the right 
to object.44  
The opinion of the advocate general, in turn, is clear in stating that 
the rights to erasure (Article 12(b)) and the right to object (Article 14(a)) 
in the Data Protection Directive are not equivalent to the right to be 
forgotten. The opinion is categorical in pointing out that the right to be 
forgotten is nowhere to be found in the current EU legal framework for 
cases in which the publication of information is de facto legitimate. 
European data protection law does not provide a right to eliminate truthful 
but embarrassing information.45 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Koops,  supra note 34 at 10. 
41 Individuals have a right to withdraw their consent when they desire to, but this 
withdrawal only affects future processing. This means that data subjects do not have, 
under the current directive, the right to request the elimination of any data solely based on 
the withdrawal of consent. See Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with 
regards to the Processing of Personal Data, 2008  O.J. 15/2011. 
42 See Rosen, supra note 4. 
43 Concretely, “regarding the scope of the right of erasure and/or the right to object, in 
relation to the “derecho al olvido” (the “right to be forgotten”)”. Google, 2014 E.C.R. C-
131/12 at ¶ 20. 
44 See Google, 2014 E.C.R. C-131/12 at ¶¶ 66-88. 
45 See Google, 2014 E.C.R. C-131/12 at ¶ 17. 
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Even when deciding differently than the advocate general, the ECJ 
seems to maintain this principle in its ruling. The court extends the broad 
reading of Articles 12 and 14 of the directive to hold that any information 
that is no longer relevant violates the directive, and its elimination can be 
therefore requested by invoking the right to erasure.  
The central difference between the right to erasure and the right to 
be forgotten is that the latter also includes data that does not breach any 
norm.46 This difference might not always be as clear as it seems. A certain 
processing of information could be considered as breaching a general 
provision of the directive because it harms a data subject; or, as the court 
does, because it is no longer relevant, even without being outdated or 
inaccurate. At the margin, the difference means that with a right to be 
forgotten, a data subject could request the deletion of the data based on a 
whim, or a preference, while under the current system there are significant 
probative and argumentative efforts necessary to prove to a court that such 
data is harmful and it violates personality rights.47 
If the right to be forgotten was enforced in the EU data protection 
system, a data subject’s personal information would have to be deleted at 
his request irrespective of harm or of the legality of the processing—with 
differing levels of amplitude depending on which of the three versions of 
the right is enforced. The right, additionally, would likely cover not only 
links displayed by search engines but also the original publications of the 
content. 
In the form established by Google, however, data subjects’ 
requests must be justifiable and will be evaluated individually on their 
merit. In that evaluation, the company has the ability to reject them, and 
those who disagree with the decision made by the company will have to 
ask a court to intervene. In this way, the result of the case illustrates the 
differentiating elements between the right to be forgotten and the rights 
data subjects have under the directive, which someone must evaluate— in 
this case, Google supervised by the court. Unless European data subjects 
can prove a violation of the directive and the presence of harm, they will 
at least for now have to face being remembered. 
 
V. Critical Discussion 
 
Under the E-commerce Directive, internet service providers in the 
EU are not liable for hosting illegal content; only the users who upload the 
content are liable. 48  The reason behind this rule is that, otherwise, 
providers might find themselves forced to police the internet in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Koops, supra note 34. 
47 See id. 
48 Directive 2000/31/EC. 
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remove content for which they could be held liable.49 The social costs of 
such policing activity (both in the form of the actual costs for the company 
and the costs of the chilling effects it would intake) are likely to be higher 
than its benefit.50 The only way to eliminate false negatives would be to 
incur in false positives, leading to collateral censorship.51 
Until recently, there was a debate on whether a similar immunity 
would apply to the data protection directive, both for internet providers 
and for search engines.52 Google v. Spain, as it was seen, makes it clear 
that for the moment it will not. 
A problem with adopting this decision is that search engines such 
as Google work with automatic algorithms, which makes it difficult for 
them to become a censor of what is published and what is not published. 
Google localizes information but it does not control it; Google cannot 
make any choices regarding its means and purposes in terms of Article 4(d) 
of the directive.  
This, as the advocate general makes clear in his opinion, makes it 
close to impossible for Google to make sure all information it indexes 
complies with Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the directive on data quality. It would 
be one thing to shift the responsibility from the content creator (in this 
case, La Vanguardia) to the content indexer (in this case, Google) if (and 
only if) the content indexer displayed reasonable means to prevent the 
indexation of such content, but to place search engines as censors of the 
internet is something else entirely.  
Still, this is not the main problem with the Google v. Spain 
decision. The main problem is that free speech is not about being able to 
express oneself in a vacuum, but about being able to transmit a message to 
people who want to hear it. 
The court argues in the case that the information indexed by 
Google is not relevant. But the decision begs the question of who decides 
what is relevant. If what information is relevant enough to be accessed is 
to be decided neither by people looking for such information nor by the 
person publishing that information, but centrally decided by a court, both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See Giovanni Sartor & M. Viola de Azevedo Cunha, The Italian Google-case: Privacy, 
Freedom of Speech and Responsibility of Providers for User-generated Contents, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1 (2010). 
50 See generally Doug Lichtman & Eric A. Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers 
Accountable, 14 SUPREME COURT ECONOMIC REVIEW 221 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, 
Rationalising Internet Safe Harbors, 6 JOURNAL OF TELECOMMUNICATION AND HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY LAW 101 (2007); Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Immunity: An Application to Cyberspace, 87 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1 (2007); 
James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, NEW YORK SCHOOL LAW REVIEW 939 
(2009). 
51 See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Digital Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPPERDINE 
LAW REVIEW 101 (2009). 
52 See Giovanni Sartor, Providers’ Liabilities in the new EU Data Protection Regulation: 
A Threat to Internet Freedoms?, 3(1) INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW 3 3 (2013). 
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freedom of expression and the right to access information will suffer a 
blow. 
Search engines are not megaphones, sending content unilaterally to 
passive recipients. Search engines are an intermediary. Recipients of the 
information which they index choose the results they look for and they 
choose which web pages from those results they read.  
The job of search tools such as Google is to help those internet 
users find the content they want to find.53 This means that if a certain 
piece of information (such as the auction of Costeja’s house) appears in 
the top search results, it does so because a large number of internet users 
considered it to be relevant: they searched for it, and when coming across 
the result they opened it.  
If there was a problem with search engines leading internet users to 
find unwanted content by accident, and such content was harmful for other 
internet users, then search engines would have incentives to correct this as 
fast as possible.54 But this is not the problem the court is concerned with.  
The court is concerned with people who look for such information 
and find it, and cobbles a solution allowing for the existence of the 
information but making it unavailable for the public who look for it on 
search engines. It is difficult to say, then, that the information is not 
relevant, and it is hardly consistent to say that the information should be 





The right to be forgotten can mean different things in the European 
data protection regime, and Google v. Spain seems to pertain to none. 
With the right to erasure, the right to forget and the right to be forgotten 
competing as the one to remain as the safeguard of data subjects in 
European law, confusion is to be expected.  
The case is centrally about defining the legal obligations of 
intermediaries such as search engines under the directive. In it, the ECJ 
dictates that the processing of data that is no longer relevant violates the 
terms of the directive and extends the right to erasure and the right to 
objection to include search engines as a consequence of considering them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See James Grimmelmann, Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 48 
(2007) (further arguing that his enhances autonomy since locating information is 
important for making choices, and it is economically efficient by allowing numerous 
welfare enhancing information exchanges that would otherwise not take place). 
54 See id. 
55 See id. (stating: “if the content really is sufficiently harmful that its suppression is 
justified, it would be better to target the owner of the site where it appears. She will 
typically have better information about what the content is, whether it is false, and who is 
responsible for creating it”). 
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data controllers (question 2) who fall under the jurisdiction of the 
European data protection system (question 1). 
Defenders of freedom of expression might be relieved. One should 
not forget, still, how dangerous it can be to censor search. 
